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Abstract—A real-time demand response system can be viewed
as a cyber-physical system, with physical systems dependent
on cyber infrastructure for coordination and control, which
may be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The time domain dynamic
behaviour of individual residential demand responses is governed
by a mix of physical system parameters, exogenous inﬂuences,
user behaviour and preferences, which can be characterized
by unstructured models such as a time-varying ﬁnite impulse
response. In this study, which is based on ﬁeld data, it is shown
how this characteristic response behaviours can be identiﬁed and
how the characterization can be updated continuously. Finally,
we propose an approach to apply this behaviour characterization
to the identiﬁcation of anomalous and potentially malicious
behaviour modiﬁcations as part of a cyber-physical intrusion
detection mechanism.
Index Terms—Demand response, Cyber-physical systems, In-
trusion detection, Data-driven
I. INTRODUCTION
Residential demand response is considered a signiﬁcant
resource of localized ﬂexibility, in particular in cases where
the heat and cooling needs of buildings are satisﬁed by electric
heating or heat pumps. As demand response is maturing from
a vision to real-world applications, it is also becoming a
potential target for cyber attacks. A real-time demand response
system can be viewed as a cyber-physical system: a physical
structure with a behaviour that is strongly inﬂuenced by
ICT facilitated interactions. Demand response behaviour is
partly governed by physical properties of the process, partly
by autonomous behaviour of residents, and in part by the
local control systems, which may be parametrized by local
users. This combination of uncertain and in-transparent system
properties leads to new challenges for reliability and security
of operation. Further, the involved control systems are more
diverse and open, which offers more entry points for cyber-
attacks. We investigate the feasibility of an online monitoring
system characterizing the dynamic response behaviour of
price-controlled demand. The goal is to formulate indicators of
anomalous behaviour based on the observable characteristics
of individual households. The investigations are based on a
data set obtained by the EcoGrid.eu project [1]. The indicators
are framed by a method for cyber-physical intrusion detection
system (CPS-IDS) developed in context of the SALVAGE
project1.
1http://www.salvage-project.com/
As demand response requires a large number of typically
quite diverse individual units, one cannot cannot expect direct
and manual monitoring. Further, occupant privacy should
be considered in such systems, thus give preference to the
applications of aggregate, purpose-build detection models, and
to avoid the use of individually traceable information. Based
on experimentally observed data, we therefore aim to develop
a modeling approach to detect speciﬁc kinds of “anomalies”
in observable response dynamics.
Whether a cyber-intervention is the actual cause of anoma-
lous behaviour cannot be inferred from physical models alone:
CPS-IDS hypotheses in the Salvage framework combine sev-
eral sources of evidence, including both cyber- and physical
anomaly and intrusion detection [2]. In the Salvage CPS-
IDS, the developed indicators are viewed as a DER analysis
component as illustrated in Fig. 1. As such anomalies may
not only be caused by external interventions, but simply be
a reﬂection of changes in the inhabitants’ behaviour. We
therefore propose a hypothesis-driven approach, which a) will
account for more apparently goal-directed changes, and b)
neglect commonly observed patterns of behavioural change.
Fig. 1. Cyber-physical IDS architecture proposed in SALVAGE project [3].
In Section II the Cyber-physical IDS concept and the
here proposed approach to behavioural anomaly detection
in demand response is introduced. Section III reviews the
applied methods. A proof-of-concept application to ﬁeld data
is reported in Section IV which supports exempliﬁes the
proposed approach to demand response modeling. The method
and results are discussed in Section V.
II. CONCEPT AND APPROACH FOR IDS
A. CPS-IDS Concept
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) gather and analyze the
information from a computer network or a system in order to
discover malicious activities or violations of policy [4]. An
IDS for application in smart grids needs to integrate both on-
line and post-mortem analyses, of both the observed cyber-
and physical systems: A Cyber-Physical Intrusion Detection
System (CPS-IDS) [2].
The cyber-physical IDS architecture proposed in the SAL-
VAGE project consists of two main parts: a domain-speciﬁc
analysis of the behavior of the individual components, and
an integrated analysis of the cyber-physical system 1. The
joint cyber-physical analysis combines the information from
both physical and cyber-security components and presents the
outcomes to the power system operator.
The initial SALVAGE CPS-IDS design had a unidirectional
structure detect anomalies in operation of both cyber and phys-
ical components [3], [5], [6]. The extended hypothesis-driven
framework, presented in [2], allows the integrated analysis
to conﬁgure and combine the available component analyses
(arrow [j] in Fig. 1). The extended architecture supports
the idea of a hypothesis testing approach to cyber-physical
security. Hypotheses in the SALVAGE CPS-IDS framework
are derived from hypothesis templates composed by domain
experts, each addressing a particular cyber-physical power
system attack goal. The hypothesis template is then matched
with the present system conﬁguration such that any applicable
hypothesis can be generated and quantiﬁed.
The different parts of the entire CPS-IDS as depicted in
Figure 1 perform each a different type of analysis. The
Cyber-physical analysis combines performs the cyber-physical
hypothesis generation [j], quantiﬁcation and ranking, assessing
the ad hoc risk of any of the active hypotheses [k]. Inputs
to this hypothesis quantiﬁcation [g,h,i], are labeled state-
and probability data generated in domain-speciﬁc analysis
modules. The module for power system analysis performs e.g.
load ﬂow based calculations, requiring network models as well
as electrical measurements. The module for cyber-security
analysis performs a model-based probabilistic simulation of
cyber attacks within the IT infrastructure that exists alongside
the physical infrastructure of the power grid and its cyber-
neighbourhood. The DER analysis assesses the current state
and likelihood of anomalous behaviour of different types of
distributed energy resources (DER), such as photovoltaic (PV)
electricity generation [3], [5] or demand response. The main
purpose of this paper is to discuss a particular variant of
the DER analysis module suitable for assessing price-based
demand response systems.
The objective of this work has been to provide online
indicators for anomalous behaviour of individual households
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Fig. 2. Conceptual outline of detection approach.
or groups of households in a demand response portfolio. Given
a certain attack hypothesis, what types of behaviour can be
expected to be observed? Such an attack hypothesis allows
to formulate a systematic character in the behaviour change.
The here investigated systematic behaviour changes include:
(a) Elimination of response amplitude (de-activate response);
(b) altering response shape to worsen “Kick-back” (to cause
grid overload or Cobweb effect [7]); (c) Inverse-response
(destabilizing system).
B. Approach for DER Behaviour IDS
In previous work, we have investigated contextual model-
based anomaly detection for DER analysis applied to photo-
voltaic (PV) DER [3], [5], [8]. There is however a fundamental
difference in the dynamical characteristics of (residential)
demand response and the PV models: instead of an algebraic
input-output relation, the residential demand response is char-
acterized by a) unobservable (random) behaviour of residents
inﬂuencing both demand volume as well as parameters of the
response characteristic, and b) the unknown thermal dynamics
of the household, inﬂuenced by further exogenous parameters.
In previous work [9], [10] on characterizing the price-
change responses from houses with smart metering equipment
the suggested approach has been to extract ﬁnite impulse
response (FIR) coefﬁcients from the price input to the demand.
The following steps are proposed:
1. General power consumption modelling. Models the part of
the system that is not sensitive to the real time prices.
2. Online price sensitivity modelling. Models the price sensi-
tivity, to reduce features of the price sensitivity signal for
anomaly detection.
3. Anomaly detection and feature extraction based on the
system online estimated parameters from step 2.
Based on these principles, the data processing concept
shown in Figure 2 has been developed.
The model comprises an ofﬂine phase where a general
system behaviour and dynamical response characteristics are
modelled, and an online phase where system parameters are
continuously identiﬁed and anomaly detection parameters are
computed as input to an IDS.
III. METHODS AND DATASET
The methods employed in this work belong to a very basic
toolset of statistical methods: linear regression, ARMAX time
series modeling and two clustering methods. The data set is
one recorded in a large scale ﬁeld demonstration of demand
response.
1) Linear Regression: Linear regression is a well known
approach for modelling a linear relationship between a set of
input variables and an output. It has the nice property that it
will always converge to the global minimum, if there are as
many or more samples than unknowns. The general form is
shown in (1), where ut, t and yt is the input, error and output,
and θt is the estimated proportionality constants [11].
yt + t = xtθx (1)
Using this method, Larsen et al [12] and [10], shows that it is
possible to extract FIRs to the real time market from another
period of the Ecogrid EU data. With prices, weather and a set
of Fourier terms as input to model the general behaviour and a
difference model modelling the response from changes in the
pricing. This provides a very condensed set of information
at DER level, describing the system response to market price
changes.
2) ARMAX system identiﬁcation: ARMAX is a model for
system identiﬁcation. It stands for Auto-Regressive Moving-
Average with eXogenous inputs. It estimates a linear model
which on a transfer function form can be written as in (2). As
an extension of the linear regression, it represents dynamics of
the system by using delayed system outputs (auto-regression)
and estimation of noise.
yt =
B(q)
A(q)
ut +
C(q)
A(q)
et (2)
A(q) is the system polynomial, B(q) and C(q) input polyno-
mials of input and noise, where ut, et and yt, are the input,
noise and output, respectively [13]. It is possible to estimate
these parameters of the polynomials in a recursive manner,
making an online system identiﬁcation, that can follow a
changing system.
3) k-Means algorithm: As described in [11], the k-Means
algorithm is a commonly used clustering algorithm for unclas-
siﬁed data. The algorithm associates data with a predeﬁned
number of clusters, iteratively minimizing the total distance
from all the samples to the cluster centroids. This is achieved
by alternating between associating the data samples with a
cluster of the closest centroid and updating the cluster centroid
as the mean point of the cluster.
This algorithm is fast and does not require prior knowledge
of the data. Key to successful clustering in higher-dimensional
sample spaces is the choice of a distance measure to calculate
the distance between each centroid and sample.
4) Cosine distance: The Cosine distance is measure ap-
plicable for the k-Means algorithm. It is not a true metric,
but has proven useful as a measure of data with a high
dimensionality where the direction of a sample vector is as
important as the sample itself [14]. The cosine distance builds
upon the dot product of vectors, thus it captures angular
distance between the sample and centroid in the k-Means
algorithm. The deﬁnition is shown in (3). Where A and B
are the feature vectors.
Dc(A,B) ≡ 1− cos(θ) = 1− A ·B||A|| ||B|| (3)
5) Gaussian mixture models: Gaussian mixture models take
a more statistical approach to the clustering problem. The idea
is to approximate n statistic sub-populations in a dataset. This
is done by maximum a posteriori estimates. Like k-Means
clustering, this is often done in iterative steps of ascending
the likelihood function and updating the population estimates
until convergence [11].
6) Dataset: The Ecogrid EU project was a research and
demonstration project for a future smart grid across the Eu-
ropean Union. It took place on the Danish island Bornholm
during the years 2011 to 2015. Characteristic for Bornholm
is a high penetration of renewable energy sources and the
grid is almost separated from the mainland, with a single
power line to Sweden. A corner stone of the Ecogrid EU, was
therefore a real-time market for activating demand response
from small scale DER [1]. The market generated 5-min real-
time imbalance prices to which household level controllers
would respond, adjusting electricity consumption of electric
space heating. The houses involved in Ecogrid EU, had a
smart-meter monitor their power consumption in ﬁve minute
intervals. For this work about 4 months of consumption data
have been assessed: in total 1736 houses and 40033 datapoints,
along with local weather data. There are, to our knowledge, no
actual attacks on the power grid, local controllers or real-time
market in the data used for this project.
IV. RESULTS
Here, the DER modeling and monitoring approach is out-
lined and exempliﬁed on ﬁeld data.
A. Stationary responsiveness
In the ofﬂine characterization we follow the methods and
approach presented in [9], [10], applying linear regression. The
results for the baseline consumption models are very similar to
the original work and will not be further discussed here. The
goal of the price sensitivity model is to extract the demand
response FIR from the power consumption data on DER level.
Following [10], the price-responsiveness of household power
consumption was modeled in form of a ﬁnite impulse response
(FIR) to the real-time price variations. The input, ut for these
models is the derivative of the difference between the real
time price (RTPt) and the day ahead price (DAt), the output
yt is the consumption data of the household subtracted the
prediction from a baseline model xt. The baseline model for
the data set has been created following [10] and is not further
discussed here.
ut =
d
dt
(RTPt −DAt) (4)
yt = ct − xt (5)
The price-changes ut are then time-lagged as input ut =
[ut . . . ut−TL ]
T computed from (4) where TL is the time lag
here chosen to be 200 minutes, or 40 samples; as output the
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Fig. 3. Top: Normalized FIR coefﬁcients for each of the 6 cluster centroids
(k=6). Bottom: Sample FIRs from each cluster (sample selection based on
confcontrolled > 0.5 and shape similarity δshape,i > 0.5). Note the x-axis
corresponds to the coefﬁcient index (40*5min = 200min) and y-axis is the
absolute sensitivity.
(5) of each of the houses to a linear regression, the linear
model (6) appears. From θFIR the FIRs of each house can be
extracted one at a time, note that .
yt + t = u
T
t θFIR (6)
The response characterization by θFIR is a stationary model
for an individual household.
B. Dynamic responsiveness characterization
An ARMAX model was implemented to emulate an online
estimation of the dynanmic responsiveness. The order of the
ARMAX model is chosen by trial and error on test data to
be 16 for the system (A(q)), spanning 80 minutes; 24 for the
input polynomial (B(q)), spanning 2 hours; 2 for the error
dynamics, spanning 10 minutes. The characteristic time of the
recursive parameter estimation algorithm is set to 14 days.
This choice balances noise with the ability to follow changing
system properties. The output of the ARMAX model is a set
of parameters for the three polynomials at each point in time.
From each parameter set, a FIR can be approximated as the
superposition of a FIR response with the input through the
parameters in B(q) and an inﬁnite impulse response (IIR) of
the system through A(q).
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic FIR as computed from the
online ARMAX estimation for a single household. The upper
graph plots the FIR coefﬁcients by lag time, as presented
in Fig. 3, and allows visual comparison with the stationary
response shape of the linear regression model. The lower
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Fig. 4. Illustration of ARMAX-based online FIR estimation. Top: comparison
of stationary response with 3 ARMAX sample responses; bottom: variation of
ARMAX FIR over observation time (vertical axis: delay-time corresponding to
x-axis in top-plot). The response amplitude is intensiﬁed, but the characteristic
shape remains.
timeseries illustration provides a colourmap of the evolution
of the ARMAX-estimated FIR parameters (vertical) along the
time period of the modeling (horizontal).
This “online” ARMAX was only applied to a subset of 150
houses of the original data set. These were chosen by selecting:
a) the 50 least and b) 50 most responsive houses, along
with c) 50 random draws among the remaining houses. The
responsiveness was measured by three amplitude parameters:
the integral, the maximum and the minimum value of the FIR.
C. Clustering of FIR
The set of stationary responses has been clustered by appli-
cation of k-Means using a cosine-distance measure applied to
normalized and down-sampled FIR parameters. The respective
cluster centroids (normalised) are plotted in presented in Fig.
3 (top). The bottom plots in the same ﬁgure illustrate the (un-
scaled) FIR responses associated with the respective cluster.
Each line represents one household FIR.
D. Characterization of Anomaly and Intent
The above outlined models are aimed to serve the char-
acterization and identiﬁcation anomalous or even malicious
behaviour in the demand response systems. To mitigate the
high uncertainties and variance in the response behaviour, two
types of metrics are applied: i) a measure of the response
amplitude or volume log(||δA||); ii) a similarity assessment,
comparing the observed behaviour shape to benevolent or
malicious behaviours. Using Gaussian Mixture (GM) models,
the statistics of these metrics are then modelled for both
‘normal’ and ‘undesired’ behaviour.
1) Responsiveness measure: A histogram of the log mag-
nitude of the three amplitude features for these 150 houses,
reveals three proto-distributions: the least controlled (uncon-
trolled) are separated from the most controlled group, with
the random selection in the middle as expected (Figure 5). As
ﬁrst measure, a ﬁlter was estimated ﬁtting a Gaussian mixture
model to the data set containing only the 100 most/least
responsive houses. This ﬁlter yields the quantity confcontrolled,
plotted as the black line in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 5. Histogram of log(||δA||) with with characterization of the price-
responsiveness amplitude. Overlayed is the Gaussian mixture (GM) model
which generates the confcontrolled parameter.
2) Similarity to base shapes: Using the cosine-distance
of the normalized response shapes, a measure similar to the
confcontrolled can be derived based on the summation of
distance features associated with the respective shapes. Two
approaches have been formulated to assess similarity to base
shapes.
The ﬁrst approach is based on the measure feature δshape,i,
deﬁned as the inverse cosine distance to the base shape,
normalized with the sum of the distance to all the shapes.
The inverse relationship on the distance is penalizing long
distances, while the normalization ensures that the features can
be compared. This approach has been applied in the cluster
allocation in Fig. 3. By manually grouping the base shapes into
a desirable and undesirable, this measure has been applied
to compute the afﬁnity with that response type: desirable
(green: BS-1 to BS-4 ) and undesirable (red: BS-5 and BS-
6), as illustrated in Fig. 7, upper plots. For the stable case
(“House 99”), here only little change in the response type
is observed, even though the response amplitude is changing
over time (Fig. 4). For the house undergoing an intervention
(“Augmented house 23”), the measure becomes stable for
higher amplitude but is sensitive at low FIR amplitudes.
The second approach uses a Gaussian Mixture Model to
characterize a conﬁdence for cluster allocation, similar to
the responsiveness measure introduced above. To identify
the 2D GMM with two centers, the cluster centroids were
again associated either with desirable or undesirable base
shapes; two features were then computed based on the sum
of log-distances to either undesirable, x1, or desirable, x2,
base shapes. The identiﬁed GMM produces a more informed
characterization of the classiﬁcation of response samples by
offering a conﬁdence-level of the classiﬁcation. Note that in
preparation of the GMM base shapes, the k-Means clustering
has been applied to a subset of the total data set, including only
the houses with 20% highest responsiveness range to extract
only signiﬁcant response contributors, yielding a different set
of cluster centroids (base shapes) than utilized in application of
the ﬁrst approach. The base shape numbers here are therefore
also different.
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by associated base shape clusters (desirable BS: {1, 2, 4, 6} ; undesirable
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In the chosen approach to clustering, the engineering
choices in sample selection and the manual base shape classi-
ﬁcation directly inﬂuence the detection outcomes. To evaluate
the ﬁnal detection effectiveness, reference cases would be
required, characterizing the systematic behaviour changes (a)-
(c) listed in Section II-A. With such reference cases, or
analytic metrics, an automatic base shape classiﬁcation could
be developed.
3) Anomaly Detection: The implemented anomaly detec-
tion evaluates changes in the feature vector δFIR. Every point
in time is assigned a probability of it being an anomaly.
Assuming difference of the features is normal distributed, their
standard deviations is estimated based on all 150 houses. These
parameters are then used to calculate an anomaly probability
at each timestamp per house.
In Figure 7, this feature is marked by a diamond, as
can be seen in the lower plot set. Here, it is apparent that
this anomaly detection is overly sensitive for low response
amplitudes (observed false positives before Dec.1s). Along
the same lines, the similarity measure (separation line between
red/green areas) reacts very sensitive in the low responsiveness
period before Dec. 1st (confcontrolled < .5). On the contrary,
it is rather stable in combination with high responsiveness, as
can be observed in both examples in Figure 7. This suggests a
combination of the measures, e.g. by reducing the conﬁdence
in the similarity measure in dependence of another measure
such as confcontrolled.
Here it is worth noting, that in case of a CPS-IDS in-
tegration, the anomaly detection component will not be ap-
plied independently. Here the statistical measures outlined
previously are better applied, as they deliver a continuous
probability value, to be employed by the CPS-IDS hypothesis
quantiﬁcation component [2].
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Fig. 7. The ARMAX and anomaly detection applied to two houses: “House
99” from Fig. 4 and “Augmented house 23” with artiﬁcially mixed response
data: shifting from low price-responsivenes to high price-responsiveness on
Dec.1st.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Based on smart metering data, the behaviour of price-
responsive control of loads can be monitored, and these
observations may be integrated in a cyber-physical intrusion
detection system (CPS-IDS).
The load response behaviour was characterized by the Finite
Impulse Response (FIR) the behaviour. The wide variety of
response shape indicates that relevant ‘anomalies’ are not
easily identiﬁed in the time domain behaviour of a group of
loads, but engineering intuition was applied to classify the
shapes of time domain behaviours observable in the data. This
expert-based approach was employed to intuitively classify
response types into “desirable” and “undesirable” features.
Statistical methods were then applied to detect and classify
behaviour anomalies. Behaviour change has been formulated
as criterion for anomalies using to independent features:
response amplitude (confcontrolled) and a similarity measure.
Both measures are formulated as a probability metric using
statistically identiﬁed distributions, so that the observed prob-
abilities can be employed in the further probabilistic reasoning
step in the CPS-IDS for risk analysis.
The results demonstrate a feasibility of a statistical approach
to integrating cyber-physical observations in demand response
oriented intrusion detection system. Parameter identiﬁcation
using the chosen ARMAX technique takes about 24h of
observation until convergence, which puts limitations on the
integration in online CPS-IDS systems, but is in line with
the time-scale of typical smart-metering data acquisition. The
validity and accuracy of the developed statistical models has to
be evaluated in future studies. Approaches to avoid the manual
classiﬁcation of response types should also be replaced by
more principled metrics based from attack goals.
The reported monitoring for normal and anomalous demand
response behaviour offers a number of possible applications
beyond the CPS-IDS application outlined here, such as: system
supervision and decision support, monitoring of an aggrega-
tor’s portfolio to estimate ﬂexibility or monitor user behaviour,
or validation of a contracted response.
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